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  Abstract  
 
This paper examines the role of open source research in human rights fact-finding and 
seeks to address a gap in the current literature, which lacks a human rights perspective, 
is dominated by journalistic approaches, or focuses on specific tools. It focuses on 
citizen media, the visual subset of open source information, and provides a 
practitioner’s perspective that is based on several years of analyzing open source 
materials for a global human rights group. The paper includes case studies on video 
and image verification, and identifies best and worst practices. 
 The author argues that open source content, specifically citizen media, can 
play a crucial and increasingly important role in human rights documentation, if 
analyzed using sound and transparent methodologies based on well-established fact-
finding principles. It presents, for the first time, a tool-independent analytical framework 
that will allow both seasoned and new human rights researchers to review and assess 
open source content. Specific recommendations are offered for human rights 
organizations, funders, academics, and technology companies in order to realize the 
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The rise of citizen media—images or video from unofficial observers such as 
bystanders, citizen journalists, activists or armed actors, usually shared through digital 
social networks—provides immense new opportunities and challenges for human rights 
researchers. Citizen media is part of a rapidly growing amount of online open source 
information, such as publically available documents, statistics, data, news reports or 
maps, which is relevant for human rights research. Citizen media can be considered 
the visual subset of open source information, and is the focus of this paper.1 Even if 
content is not open source but collected during field missions or through in-country 
contacts instead, open source information and freely available online tools such as 
mapping platforms and metadata software can be used to verify it.  
Utilizing these sources of information and research tools is becoming an 
increasingly sought-after skill in many industries, including humanitarian response and 
human rights research. The similarities to integrating Geographic Information Systems 
(GIS) into human rights research are apparent. Around ten years ago, Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch originally sought the support of external experts 
such as the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) for remote 
sensing and mapping products.2 These human rights groups now have dedicated GIS 
staff, and a similar trend is likely in open source research. 
The shift from traditional systems of information control and distribution, 
resulting from digital technologies and networks, most obviously affects states but also 
intergovernmental, humanitarian and human rights organizations. Whether police 
brutality in the United States, war crimes in Syria or a typhoon in the Philippines, it is 
likely that someone with a camera and access to the Internet will be present to reveal 
what would have otherwise gone unnoticed. The exposure of any of these events is no 
longer dependent on established media or human rights organizations. The availability 
of camera-enabled cell phones in combination with digital social networks is nothing 
short of a game changer, especially for human rights research and advocacy, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For an introductory textbook on open source research more broadly, see Bazzell, M. 2015: Open Source Intelligence 
Techniques: Resources for Searching and Analyzing Online Information. 
2 See the work of the AAAS Geospatial Technologies and Human Rights project 
http://www.aaas.org/program/geospatial-technologies-project [referenced 11 November 2015] 
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offers enormous opportunities if properly integrated with well-established fact-finding 
methodologies. 
Within hours of the chemical weapons attack in the eastern suburbs of 
Damascus on 21 August 2013, more than a hundred videos were uploaded to 
YouTube3, showing the horrific impact of this illegal attack. A review of the videos by 
medical and chemical weapons experts, combined with testimonies from survivors and 
doctors, allowed human rights researchers to establish basic facts about the attack and 
the chemical agents used, even before U.N. investigators were able to produce a 
comprehensive assessment through direct ground access. 
Nevertheless, the challenges are enormous, as footage of atrocities with 
inaccurate context is increasingly circulating on the Internet, especially during times of 
crisis that are characterized by uncertainty and anxiety. 4   Such content has the 
potential to trigger new violence and abuses in fragile communities and exaggerate 
existing tensions. This risk not only requires extreme caution and responsibility from 
human rights groups who conduct fact-finding, but also the development of robust and 
transparent methodologies of citizen media verification tailored towards human rights 
researchers and investigators. 
This primer targets both seasoned and new human rights researchers who 
would like to integrate citizen media into their research. Most importantly, this paper is 
intended as a resource for students of human rights who would like to acquire skills in 
non-traditional human rights research. There is currently a clear gap in the literature on 
open source human rights research and verification, which is limited to case studies, 
journalistic approaches or the description of specific tools. This paper is an attempt to 
address this gap in teachings of human rights practice, with the hope it will complement 
current syllabi of both university and training courses. The very goal of presenting an 
analytical framework is to provide documentation and publication strategies that are 
tool-independent, which is crucial for a field that is emerging so quickly and that relies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See, for example: Brown Moses YouTube playlist: Alleged Chemical Attack in Eastern Ghouta August 21st 2013. 
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLPC0Udeof3T4NORTjYmPoNCHn2vCByvYG [referenced 17 January 2016] 
4 For a recent study on the “online misinformation ecosystem” in general, and the role that media plays in contributing to 
rumor propagation, see Silverman, Craig: Lies, Damn Lies, and Viral Content. How news websites spread (and debunk) 
online rumors, unverified claims, and misinformation. Tow Center for Digital Journalism, 10 February 2015 
http://towcenter.org/research/lies-damn-lies-and-viral-content/ [referenced 16 November 2015]. As the author states on 
page 35: “There is a growing online misinformation ecosystem that churns out false information at an increasing pace. 
Its success often depends on two factors: the ability to cause sharing cascades on social networks and the ability to get 
online media to assist in the propagation, thereby adding a layer of credibility that further increases traffic and sharing.” 
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heavily on changing technology. Tools are coming and going, and can become quickly 
outdated due to changing or new online platforms.5 Research (and funding) that is 
exclusively focused on tools and tool development is thus shortsighted. Nevertheless, 
the author presents this framework as a basis for discussion with the hope to 
strengthen it with the increased use by practitioners. 
Journalists largely dominate the field of citizen media verification. Both 
journalists and human rights researchers are truth-seekers, and it is encouraging to 
see strong collaboration between the fields of journalism and human rights on this topic, 
in the form of talks, publications and training materials. In fact, human rights 
practitioners rely heavily on the very tools and techniques used or developed by 
journalists. However, the practice of human rights research requires a distinct 
methodology that not only justifies, but encourages, a human rights fact-finding 
approach. In addition to identifying violations of specific laws, norms and standards, 
human rights research is normally integrated into an advocacy strategy that seeks 
specific redress for the identified violations. This advocacy work, which is typically 
carried out in a very public manner, binds human rights groups—as protection actors—
to specific professional standards in regards to their sources and materials. The use of 
citizen media, which often reveals information on specific individuals in great detail, is 
no exception. 
 The main goal of this paper is to provide a methodological approach to open 
source human rights research and verification. Almost every step of the analytical 
framework, such as ethics or metadata review, would justify separate papers. The 
author has thus made an effort to reference additional resources and readings where 
available.  
 
Citizen Media in Human Rights Fact-Finding 
All that is clear is that the field of human rights fact-finding is changing very 
quickly and that it is assuming an inter-disciplinary dimension that was 
largely lacking not so long ago (Alston, 2013: 62).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Tools and functionalities referenced in this paper are up to date as of December 2015.  
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In May 2015, a Human Rights Watch staffer erroneously tweeted out a YouTube 
video captured by a drone that he thought showed the impact of barrel bombs on 
Aleppo—the footage was in fact from Gaza in 2014. As part of a large investigation 
related to the same conflict, Amnesty International accidentally used a clip of an 
edited—and thus potentially misleading—YouTube video to communicate the research 
findings.6 
These two small examples illustrate how even well-established human rights 
watchdogs, which played seminal roles in establishing traditional and well-tested fact-
finding methods, are not immune to mistakes in the digital age. Luckily, human rights 
fact-finding methodology is not static, but is evolving as information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) are changing. However, this “third-generation fact-finding” (Alston 
2013: 61)—stemming from the quickly changing nature of ICTs, among other factors—
still requires the development of well-tested methodologies and analytical frameworks.7 
In addition to having a responsibility to avoid mistakes, the need for research 
and resources on the topic of open source research and verification seems clear. First, 
the media and reporting landscape shifted dramatically since the emergence of 
traditional fact-finding reports and methodologies by intergovernmental bodies and 
NGOs in the 1960s-1980s. The use of video to record human rights violations, and 
even its use in legal proceedings, is nothing new. Past examples include the Rodney 
King video (1991), the Zoran Petrovic video (1995), and footage showing Congolese 
militia leader Thomas Lubanga Dyilo commanding child soldiers (2003), which was 
subsequently used as evidence in his trial at the International Criminal Court.8 However, 
the drastic impact on human rights fact-finding stems from the increased availability of 
mobile phones and proliferation of digital (social) networks, allowing witnesses to share 
content with millions in real time. It is safe to assume that technology and infrastructure 
changes will continue, which will also impact countries that are still characterized by a 
scarcity of citizen media, such as Mali or North Korea (Koettl 2013a and 2013b). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Both mistakes were quickly removed and corrected upon discovery.  
7 According to this categorization by Philip Alston, the first generation of human rights fact-finding describes the work of 
intergovernmental bodies. The second generation represents the methodologies developed by international non-
governmental organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch in the 1970s and 1980s. See 
Alston, P. 2013. Introduction: Third Generation Human Rights Fact-Finding. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting 
(American Society of International Law), CVII,61. 
8 Rodney King beating video. Full length footage https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sb1WywIpUtY [referenced 17 July 
2015]; Zoran Petrovic video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=344e_D-Vc7g [referenced 17 July 2015]; Film evidence 
for using child soldiers by Lubanga https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ySF8ojE6n4 [referenced 17 July 2015] 
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Commercial actors are even considering the use of high-altitude balloons, drones and 
satellites to close digital black holes (Palermo 2014). 
For human rights researchers, there are profound implications of sharing 
potential evidence through digital social networks. Unlike the King and Petrovic videos 
mentioned above, the source for a lot of content remains unclear. A host of videos on 
YouTube, for example, are mere scrapes that were re-uploaded, often with the wrong 
context. This fact requires researchers to learn new tools and methodologies to identify 
the original source—a sort of basic “social media forensics” which deviates from 
analyzing traditional photographic or video materials collected during field research.  
Secondly, seasoned human rights practitioners have identified a need for 
further research into new investigative methodologies (Alston 2013: 62). Notable efforts 
have already been made in regards to geospatial technologies (Bromley 2009; Lyons 
2012; Edwards/Koettl 2011; Edwards/Sulik 2010; Wolfinbarger/Wyndham 2011; 
Wolfinbarger 2015) and quantitative and inferential analysis (Seybolt et al 2013; Root 
2013; Price/Ball 2014). However, a gap still exists in regards to the use of citizen media, 
with existing efforts focusing on activism and advocacy (Gregory 2010 and 2012) and 
ethics (Bair 2014a; Edwards/Koettl 2016). While these issues are intimately linked to 
human rights fact-finding, little resources exist on best practices of open source 
analysis, let alone an analytical framework that is based on a human rights fact-finding 
approach (which is different from purely fact-checking often deployed in journalism). 
New academic publications on transformations in human rights fact-finding 
(Alston/Knuckey 2015) also appear to fall short of providing a methodological 
exploration of open source research and verification that is geared towards 
practitioners. 
Finally, a welcomed consequence of the use of citizen media in human rights 
research is that it invites increased scrutiny. Human rights practitioners are thus well 
advised to proactively develop a sound and transparent methodology, as well as 
resources that conform with the fundamental principles of human rights fact-finding: 
the ability to independently, objectively and impartially collect relevant 
information, confirm its veracity, and analyze this information to produce 
credible evidence about violations, their causes and effects, as well as 
identify their perpetrators (Pillay 2010). 
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The risks of getting it wrong are high, with a potential to do enormous harm, not only to 
the work of a specific organization, but to the profession of the human rights 
investigator as a whole:  
For NGOs, the stakes in surviving such scrutiny could not be higher. The 
credibility of their fact-finding is their stock-in-trade. Broadly stated, the chief 
objective of human rights NGOs is to promote compliance with international 
human rights standards. (…) Fact-finding lies at the heart of these efforts, 
and the fact-finding “works” when it convinces the target audience that the 
published allegations are well founded (Orentlicher, 1990: 92-93). 
 
Added Value 
 Analyzing citizen media should by no means be considered a separate 
endeavor from traditional fact-finding, which is largely centered on witness testimony. 
In fact, overreliance on social media content can be misleading, due to a potential 
structural bias in social media networks (Lynch et al, 2014). Its use will be most 
impactful when integrated into standard fact-finding, accompanied by dedicated 
resources and workflows for researchers. Most importantly, the comparative advantage 
of citizen media should be considered, which can be identified as follows: 
1. Access and control circumvention: Standard publications on fact-finding 
highlight the challenge of accessing a conflict zone or other human rights 
hotspots, a problem that is often exacerbated by restrictions on official media 
outlets (Orentlicher, 1990: 94). Over the last several years, advances in remote 
sensing have made significant progress in circumventing this obstacle, which is 
most evident in the heavy reliance on satellite imagery by the Commission of 
Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea.9 
The ubiquity of cell phone cameras and digital networks further helped 
to address the access challenge, making it easier for activists, journalists and 
ordinary citizen to circumvent official restrictions on media and freedom of 
expression. Traditional strategies used by governments (or armed groups) to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Satellite images of 
currently existing political prison camps (kwanliso) in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 28 January 2014. 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoIDPRK/Report/satellite-images/coi-dprk-satellite-images-
political-prison-camps-28-jan-2014.pdf [referenced 13 November 2014] 
Koettl, C., 'Analytical Framework for Citizen Media Research and Verification’, January 2016 
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control information are increasingly failing, thus opening up new opportunities 
for researchers. 
 
2. Level of detail: Citizen media provides an extreme level of detail, and creates 
a permanent record of that information, if preserved appropriately.10 A human 
rights researcher can thus go back in time in order to access that record, which 
in some cases might be more detailed and accurate than witness testimony. 
Additionally, it can provide visual documentation of violations—such as torture, 
extrajudicial executions or enforced disappearances—that would go undetected 
through remote sensing, another option used to access past records. Examples 
of details that are highly relevant for human rights fact-finding include 
geographic features (landmarks, signage or vegetation), insignias, license 
plates, inventory or serial numbers, or even name badges on uniforms.  
 
3. Intimidation resistance: A methodology that is heavily focused on testimony 
naturally comes with challenges related to witness intimidation, as part of non-
cooperation by states and non-state actors (Pillay 2010). An advantage of 
citizen media is its high level of intimidation resistance—it’s difficult to intimidate 
a YouTube video if the uploader is anonymous. This added value becomes 
even more important with the emergence of documentation apps that capture 
relevant metadata and chain of custody records.11  This so-called “point of 
capture approach” to verification (vs. open source research and content 
analysis as presented here) also allows for the non-public sharing of materials, 
such as with the International Bar Association in the case of the eyeWitness to 
Atrocities app. The generated file can be considered forensically authentic due 
to the accompanying extensive metadata, while the filmer has the option to 
delete all traces from his or her cell phone, and never to share the material 
online. While this approach still has to be proven impactful in real-life scenarios, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The increased use of live video should be closely followed in this regard. While most live streaming apps store the 
broadcast for later use, it is unclear how permanent such a record is. 
11 The most prominent tools are the CameraV (https://guardianproject.info/apps/camerav) and eyeWitness to Atrocities 
(http://www.eyewitnessproject.org/) apps.  
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To be clear, citizen media is not a panacea for all challenges of human rights 
fact-finding, let alone securing redress. In fact, the challenges of working with citizen 
media are immense. In addition to the sheer amount of information shared through 
social media, there are two major obstacles for effectively integrating citizen media in 
human rights research: 
1. The material can easily disappear. Human rights relevant content, and potential 
evidence, is regularly lost as content is removed for various reasons. The 
permanent record of a violation or incident, as discussed above, might thus 
become irrelevant if not secured properly.  
2. The material is shared with the wrong context, is old, or is outright manipulated, 
posing a high risk of inaccuracy. 
These two major challenges are addressed through the analytical framework presented 
below. A more comprehensive review of challenges, including security, ethics or 
curation, related specifically to citizen video and human rights, have been previously 
addressed elsewhere (WITNESS 2011). 
 
Analytical Framework 
The framework presented here should not be considered a mechanical process or 
scientific formula. Former UN Higher Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay once 
said, “analyzing information is akin to putting together a jigsaw puzzle” (2010) and 
nowhere is this more applicable than in relation to citizen media. However, there are 
numerous techniques that can greatly aid human rights researchers in completing that 
puzzle. The principal ones are outlined below.13 The main purpose of this framework is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Bowcott, O: eyeWitness to Atrocities: the app aimed at bringing war criminals to justice. The Guardian, 7 June 2015 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/08/eyewitness-to-atrocities-the-app-aimed-at-bringing-war-criminals-
to-justice [referenced 11 November 2015] 
13 For additional resources, please see relevant online resources: An interactive step-by-step guide focused on 
YouTube videos: http://citizenevidence.org/2014/07/01/verifying/. The Citizen Evidence website is a dedicated resource 
Koettl, C., 'Analytical Framework for Citizen Media Research and Verification’, January 2016 
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to provide human rights researchers with guidance to allow them to integrate new skills 
into their existing work, independent of specific software or tools. This becomes even 
more relevant as well-established digital forensics methods, which traditionally deal 
with original content from a recording device, might be too narrow when analyzing 
social media content that has been heavily altered during the publishing and sharing 
process. While a file shared and published through WhatsApp or Facebook, for 
example, would not be considered authentic and consistent with an original from a 
digital image forensics viewpoint due to the resulting change in metadata or 
compression, it might still yield valuable insights for human rights research. However, 
in order to use these insights publicly in research and advocacy, the underlying 
methodology of review has to be sound, reliable and transparent.  
The framework below does not include a detailed assessment of the application of 
international human rights, humanitarian, refugee and criminal law, or national laws, 
which requires a separate, often legal, analysis. This lies at the heart of human rights 
fact-finding and should form the basis of any research that includes citizen media. For 
example, a video showing a Syrian armed group shooting down an army helicopter 
may have immense news value; however, it may not have probative value for a human 
rights group, as such an event might not violate International Humanitarian Law (IHL). 
The footage could instead provide valuable context or linkage evidence, i.e. it might 
establish facts such as the presence of a specific commander or unit at a specific place 
and date.  
Finally, this framework should not be confused with digital forensics analysis. It 
is the author’s opinion that relevant experts with appropriate training should be 
consulted for more advanced, technical analysis or counterfeit detection, which often 
requires the use of expensive and proprietary software.  
The case studies in the last section detail how the framework below (Table 1) 
has been applied in real life human rights research. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
for human rights researchers and includes a list of tools and further readings. WITNESS Tip Sheet: Authenticating Open 
Source Video. How to Verify Online Video of Human Rights Abuses. 
http://www.mediafire.com/view/cd7b76ydpe22khn/AuthenticatingOpenSourceVideo_2013.pdf Relevant journalistic 
resources are the two “Verification Handbooks”, published by the European Journalism Center 
http://verificationhandbook.com/ [all referenced 2 January 2015] 




Prerequisite Self-Care Plan for Secondary Trauma Prevention 
1 Material Collection and Preservation 
2 Metadata Review 
3 Verification of Provenance and Source 
4 Content Analysis 
5 Optional: Expert Analysis 
6 Integration with Other Research 
7 Professional Standard Considerations 
Table 1: Analytical Framework 
 
Prerequisite: Self-care plan and policies for secondary trauma 
prevention 
Before diving into the details of the analytical framework, a word of caution: the 
new digital environment comes with new risks to human rights researchers, who spend 
a significant time analyzing videos or images depicting human rights violations. At the 
extreme end, this footage can consist of horrific and extremely graphic content of 
torture, executions or sexual violence. This exposure, whose negative effect is often 
compared to low-level radiation14, opens up the risk of secondary trauma for desk 
researchers, which can lead to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). With a few 
exceptions (Dubberley et al, 2015), little resources and systematic research exist on 
this topic. Human rights groups and researchers should thus have the proper 
organizational and individual systems in place to address this risk, prior to starting 
research - which appears to be a current gap in practice.  
Our research shows that human rights organizations are failing in their duty of 
care to professionals working with this content, and that these professionals are 
scared about admitting to their managers that they are having a hard time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See, for example: Dart Center for Journalism and Trauma: Working with Traumatic Imagery. Tip Sheet. 11 August 
2014. http://dartcenter.org/content/working-with-traumatic-imagery [referenced 4 November 2015] 
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dealing with some of the more distressing images they are seeing day in day 
out (Dubberley 2015). 
 
Secondary trauma prevention can start with developing individual self-care 
plans (Rees 2014), but should also include more professional support, similar to 
options for (returning) field researchers.  
 
Step 1: Material Collection and Preservation  
A huge and unique challenge with content shared online is that it can quickly 
vanish. The video and human rights group WITNESS has preliminarily identified a total 
of six categories (in addition to unknown reasons) of how human rights footage is 
removed from the public domain (WITNESS 2015). The first step when analyzing 
citizen media is to save the file that is being investigated, preferably a copy of the 
original video, but if it's not available, then the highest quality copy. Further, all 
available documentation should be collected, including the URL, the exact time of 
publication and screenshots of the posting.15 It is important to highlight that saving 
content is not the same as archiving, which requires a more sophisticated system that 
includes cataloging and backup considerations, among others. WITNESS has 
developed extensive resources related to archiving of videos (Ng 2014). 
Once the file is saved, efforts should also be undertaken to avoid inadvertently 
altering the content or the metadata (when dealing with original content that comes 
directly from the source). Human rights researchers should strive to adopt high 
standards of handling digital evidence, similar to those used in forensic or criminal 
investigations (which could include write-blocker software that prevents editing the 
content that is being analyzed). The preservation of online content also creates 
important responsibilities and ethical obligations for human rights groups (see step 7 
below). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 A new tool called Video-Vault, currently available as a beta version for human rights researchers, is automating this 
process in regard to online videos https://www.bravenewtech.org/  
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Step 2: Metadata Review 
In many cases, this step might be irrelevant as social media sites alter or 
remove a majority of relevant metadata, such as time stamps or GPS coordinates.16 A 
thorough visual content analysis (see below step 4) can offset the lack of metadata. 
However, reviewing any existing metadata is a crucial step and can contribute to highly 
relevant findings such as establishing the exact time, date and location of an incident. 
Metadata can also identify the specific recording device, which can be cross-
referenced with information provided by the actual source, in case footage is handed 
over to researchers (instead of being pulled from the Internet), or if the actual 
eyewitness can be interviewed. Not all content uploaded to the Internet is stripped of its 
metadata. The photo-sharing platform Flickr, for example, preserves EXIF data 
(information about an image) of uploaded images. It is thus crucial for researchers to 
conduct a basic review of metadata, such as EXIF information on images, when 
available.17 
Even if the metadata is incorrect due to device settings, conclusions can still be 
drawn from it, such as connecting content from the same device and incident. To give 
a specific example, five different videos with a time stamp of 1 January 1960, as part of 
a larger batch of videos, suggest that the five videos came from the same recording 
device (with an incorrect date setting) and incident, as was the case in a recent 
Amnesty International investigation. Video files with a timestamp of 1 January 1904 are 
normally downloaded from YouTube (in this case, the metadata normally also lists 
“googlevideo.com”).18 
Reviewing metadata—including “public metadata” such as upload time—early 
in the review process is crucial. On one hand, it might save an enormous amount of 
time: intact metadata—such as GPS coordinates or timestamp—will make certain 
steps in the content analysis (step 4 below) redundant. Additionally, determining the 
exact local upload time on social media sites will help to determine the original source 
(step 3 below).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For more details on this process from a digital forensic perspective, see Ng, N: Cell Phone Images in Social Media. 
Thesis. Summer 2013. 
http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/CAM/Centers/ncmf/Documents/Cell_Phone_Images_in_Social_Media_Th
esis-Nicholas_Ng.pdf [referenced 14 November 2014] 
17 Using free and specialized software such as Invisor Lite (Mac) or Opanda IExif (PC), or websites such as 
www.findexif.com or http://www.imageforensic.org/  
18 A free and easy to use software to review video metadata is MediaInfo. 




Public metadata is publicly visible information such as the upload time or the unique ID 
that is assigned to any piece of citizen media. This information, such as the timestamps 
on social media sites, should be thoroughly reviewed. Determining the exact, local 
upload time is crucial, and failure to do so can lead to inaccurate research and 
confusion. As of 2015, the publishing date on YouTube, for example, represents the 
US Pacific Time Zone, which includes California where the company’s headquarter is 
based. The result is that some videos can reflect a different date from when it was 
actually published and when an incident occurred. The most prominent example is the 
chemical weapons attack in Syria in August 2013. The attack happened early on 21 
August 2013, with the first videos on YouTube being published in the early morning 
hours, local time. However, many videos showed 20 August as the publishing date, 
due to the ten hour time difference between Syria and the US west coast, prompting a 
Russian Foreign ministry spokesperson to claim that the attack has been staged, since 
“reports circulating on the Internet, (…) had been posted for several hours before the 
so-called attack.”19 The YouTube Data API allows for the extraction of the exact 
publishing time and date in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), which can easily be 
converted into local time using any online time zone converter. Amnesty International’s 
YouTube Data Viewer provides a simple and user-friendly online form to perform this 
analysis. 20 
Twitter is different. A user can choose the time zone in the account settings, 
which will affect the timestamp of all tweets. Setting the time zone to U.S. Eastern 
Standard Time (EST), for example, will result in showing the timestamps of all tweets in 
EST, requiring conversations of timestamps to local time when attempting to determine 
the exact time of a posting or incident outside the eastern United States.  
Facebook is slightly different, and unfortunately not entirely transparent. In 
contrast to YouTube and Twitter, Facebook’s timestamps adjust for the time zone a 
user is currently in (assuming the time zone settings on the computer are correctly set 
to the computer’s physical location, which happens automatically, but can also be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Aleksandr Lukashevich, quoted in: Russia Today: Materials implicating Syrian 
govt in chemical attack prepared before incident – Russia. 23 August 2013. http://rt.com/news/syria-chemical-prepared-
advance-901/  [referenced 23 November 2014] 
20 YouTube Data Viewer http://citizenevidence.org/2014/07/01/youtube-dataviewer/ [referenced 23 November 2014] 
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changed manually). The actual local upload time can thus be determined by using an 
online time zone converter (or by changing the time zone on a computer).  
 
Platform Public timestamp based on 
Facebook Computer settings 
Twitter Account settings 
YouTube US Pacific Time (California) 
Table 2: Public timestamps of postings across selected social media platforms  
 
A Facebook post referring to an overnight attack in Syria early in the morning 
on 24 June 2014 can lead to confusion when looking at it from Washington, DC, since 
if it was posted around 6pm in the evening on 23 June 2014, the story does not match 
up.21 However, adjusting for time zone differences, the local (Syrian) publishing time is 
1:20am in the morning of 24 June, making it consistent with other reports. A challenge 
with Facebook is that results differ when using different browsers or computers, 
resulting in inconsistent test results. 
Despite some inconsistencies, recognizing these differences and adjustments, 
and taking them into account when researching specific incidents, is crucial. For 
example, the exact timing of an attack is critical when determining its legality and 
considering violations of IHL. Furthermore, identifying the exact local upload time is 
important to establish the first upload of content, and subsequently the likely original 
source.  
Online citizen media should also be reviewed for any location data. Some social 
media sites provide the option to manually add location information. However, not a lot 
of citizen media is geo-tagged. According to research from 2010, only an estimated 3 
percent of YouTube videos were geo-tagged (Friedland/Sommer: 2010). Even when a 
video on YouTube has coordinates associated with it, the location should still be 
independently confirmed using satellite imagery available through online mapping 
platforms or applications such as Google Maps or Google Earth. Since the uploader 
can manually enter the location, this information can be inaccurate or outright wrong. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Posting by Wesam Hospital in Kafarzeita, Syria, 24 June 2014. 
https://www.facebook.com/weasamhospital/posts/663953530362991 [referenced 25 July 2015] 
Koettl, C., 'Analytical Framework for Citizen Media Research and Verification’, January 2016 
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Step 3: Verification of Provenance and Source 
Evaluating the credibility of a source is at the core of human rights fact-finding, 
and video and photographic material are no exception. Even among new fact-finding 
methodologies, open source research and verification poses unique challenges, 
especially when shared via social digital networks, the prevalent distribution system.  
In comparison to remote sensing22, a more established but still novel research 
method in human rights, establishing the original source and provenance of citizen 
media can be extremely challenging. The limited number of commercial satellite image 
providers and the cost implications make remote sensing analysis very transparent and 
easily repeatable—the source for both the imagery and analysis is normally easily 
traceable and verifiable. In contrast, citizen media is often copied and re-uploaded 
online, which can turn the search for the original source into a very cumbersome 
process. It should be considered best practice to track down the original source of the 
content under investigation, even when there’s no difference in the actual content. An 
example of a violation of this practice—outside the human rights space—is the 
YouTube playlist of the chemical weapons attack in Syria of August 2013, assembled 
for the US Senate Intelligence Committee, which included several copies (McMahon 
2013). 
There are several strategies and tools that can assist with this effort. First, the 
account history and activity should be reviewed. Newly created social media accounts 
that only contain one dramatic video or picture should be considered suspicious. A 
textbook example for this was the account that hosted the hoax “Syria Hero Boy” video, 
which had been specifically created for this purpose, and only contained a single 
video.23  
The source should also be reviewed for links to other social media accounts, in 
order to establish a basic digital profile of the source under review. This information 
can also be used to potentially contact the source directly, if safe to do so. Tracking 
down other accounts might also make it easier to contact the source if needed. 
Additionally, other content posted by the same account holder should be reviewed for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Collecting information about the earth from afar, for example through satellite imaging or aerial photography. 
23 Lawaff Law YouTube Channel https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC3u4Ygo_gFbJ1ii9k1tpyEA/feed [referenced 25 
November 2014] Note that the video has since been removed. See also statement by director Lars Klevberg: Press 
release regarding a published video on Youtube and several media channels. 
https://twitter.com/LarsKlevberg/status/533385072083501056/photo/1 [referenced 26 December 2015] 
16 	   	  Human Rights in the Digital Age: CGHR Practitioner Paper 1 
	  
geographic discrepancies, and to establish if the uploader actually appears to come 
from the specific region, city or neighborhood where an incident reportedly took place.  
If no additional accounts are listed, further research can still be conducted. 
Videos and pictures shared via social media normally include a unique identifier 
contained in the URL. For YouTube, for example, the unique video ID is at the end of 
any YouTube video link.24 Searching this unique identifier lists other instances where 
the video or image was shared online, and might provide hints as to who first shared 
the material. There are also specialized search engines that allow for searching social 
media content and profiles.25 Another option is to conduct a reverse image search on 
the profile picture of an account, which can find places online where the same image 
was posted.26 This might lead to other accounts by the same individual. Many social 
media and other websites allow for advanced searches, which can help finding 
additional details about a specific account (Meyers 2015). 
Another strategy to track down the original source of citizen media is to conduct 
a reverse image search with the actual content. It is important to stress that this 
method can also be applied to online videos. Amnesty International developed a tool27 
that extracts, among other information, all thumbnails (a small image preview image) 
that are created when a video is uploaded to YouTube. Conducting a reverse image 
search with these thumbnails locates other websites that host the same video. These 
simple techniques, which do not require any technical skills whatsoever, can be highly 
effective during research, since the biggest challenge related to verifying human rights 
relevant citizen media is not technical manipulation, but content that is shared within 
the wrong context. Analysts encounter this problem on an ongoing basis and examples 
are numerous. Prominent past cases were a video of a chainsaw beheading reportedly 
from Syria, which turned out to be from Mexico instead, and a Nigeria video (discussed 
in detail in the case study below) that was claimed to be from the Central African 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vHlFjuF4Hlo, the unique video ID is vHlFjuF4Hlo  
25 See, for example, Pipl.com https://pipl.com/   
26 The two most prominent sites to perform reverse image searches are Google Images https://images.google.com/ and 
TinEye http://www.tineye.com/  
27 YouTube Data Viewer http://citizenevidence.org/2014/07/01/youtube-dataviewer/ 
Koettl, C., 'Analytical Framework for Citizen Media Research and Verification’, January 2016 
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Republic. During the 2014 conflict in Gaza, numerous pictures from the 2009 and 2012 
conflict, as well as from the war in Syria, were tweeted out.28  
When materials are sent directly to researchers, the file name can sometimes 
provide basic clues about the provenance and source. Images downloaded from 
certain social media sites but claimed as “originals” can easily be tracked if the 
filename is not changed, since social media sites—as computer programs in general—
are very predictable. For example, an image with the file name 
11752526_10152946825742217_7382660443365520847_n stems from Facebook. 
The middle number is actually the photo ID, leading to the exact web address of the 
picture if one simply adds it to the standard photo link on Facebook: 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10152946825742217. This pattern allows 
creating simple tables of filenames for images downloaded from social media sites 
(Table 2), and a determination of the source of the image without ever looking at it.  
 





3 numbers ending with "n"; middle number = photoID 15 characters 
Table 3: Filenames of sample images downloaded from major social media sites. Facebook and Twitter 
follow a standardized system of image file naming.  
 
Finally, an occasionally useful but often overlooked strategy used to track down 
the original source of removed content is to look at cached websites. Cached websites 
are basically archived versions of a website, and several tools exist to access these. It 
is important to note that this does not work with most social media sites such as 
YouTube or Facebook, which limits its use. However, it can nevertheless yield useful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See for an example a picture posted in July 2014 here https://twitter.com/Pxlestine/status/489855461680627712 and 
compare with an AP photo from November 2012 here: 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/multimedia/image/gazajpg_734822/ [all referenced 27 July 2015] 
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results when looking for removed images. In January 2015, when reviewing images of 
corpses of a failed coup attempt in Gambia, looking at a cached version of a website 
allowed Amnesty International analysts to reveal removed content and identify the 
likely source of the images under investigation.  
 
 
Same website, different dates: compared to the live website (left), the cached version (right) shows the 
content from a few days earlier, revealing images that have been removed in the meantime (pixelation in 
right image added by author). 
Step 4: Content Analysis  
Once information about the source is gathered, the researcher can focus on the 
actual content of the material under review. In addition to identifying location and 
date/time, this step is highly relevant for human rights researchers. It could allow for 
the extraction of a level of detail that is of extraordinary significance for human rights 
research, going as far as identifying specific weaponry, units, or individuals, and 
allowing to potentially draw conclusions of command responsibility in situations of 
armed conflict. 
This process becomes much easier for videos when reviewing them in slow 
motion. In the case of YouTube videos, simply changing the settings of the YouTube 
video can achieve this. Alternatively, any video editing software29 by default includes 
such a feature. A frame-by-frame review will also help to detect potential edits in a 
video, an important fact that can have significant implications for the analysis of a video.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Including the free VLC media player http://www.videolan.org/vlc/index.html  




A very efficient, although time-consuming, way to confirm the location of an 
incident is to carefully identify relevant features in a video or picture that can be 
matched up with satellite imagery, street-view imagery, or other open source videos 
and pictures, including geo-referenced pictures available on specialized websites.30 
The list of features that can help to pinpoint a location is long and includes traffic signs, 
license plates, names of shops, landmarks, vegetation and terrain, other distinct-
looking features such as graffiti or street lamps, or conditions of roads (paved vs. non-
paved). Google Earth has the added value of providing historical satellite imagery, 
allowing a researcher not only to go back in time, but also to look at a scene from 
slightly different angles, due to the different positions and angles of satellites. This is 
further aided by the function to change the viewpoint, allowing a researcher to put 
himself in the perspective of the filmer. In contrast, Google Maps has the added value 
of historical street view imagery. Editable platforms such as WikiMapia or Open Street 
Map often provide much more detailed and updated geographic information than 
proprietary and closed platforms such as Google. Recognizing these different 
comparative advantages can be helpful during research. Finally, an additional feature 
to look out for is language and dialect, both written and spoken.  
 
Date 
Independently confirming the date of an incident remains one of the biggest 
challenges when analyzing citizen media. In contrast to location, there are few features 
that can be used to confirm the date. Indicators to at least approximate the date include 
weather and clothing, used in combination with databases of historical weather data.31 
A more effective approach is to look for other open source materials that can 
corroborate an incident. Shadow analysis can be used to approximate the time of day.  
 
Agency 
In addition to place and time, manually extracting features can help with 
identifying specific actors. Relevant features include uniforms, flags, insignia, weapons, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The most prominent being Panoramio http://www.panoramio.com/  
31 For example, Wolfram Alpha https://www.wolframalpha.com/  
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inventory or serial numbers, munitions, license plates or clothing. A useful technique is 
to compare the extracted features with publically available images to highlight 
similarities or discrepancies between specific objects. For example, this could entail 
comparing insignias on uniforms with the official insignias available on public websites 
of military, security or police forces, or munitions with imagery available on specialized 
databases and open source content. 
 
Other recording devices 
Finally, researchers should pay special attention to detect other recording 
devices visible in videos or images. This indicates that other materials are available 
(even if not always available online) documenting the same incident, often from a 
different angle that can provide new clues about an incident (Hodson 2013; Mackey 
2014). 
 
Step 5: Optional: Expert consultations (including counterfeit 
detection) 
Consulting with experts, such as forensic pathologists, weapons specialists, or 
experts in digital image forensics, is an optional step in the analytical framework, which 
should be decided on a case-by-case basis. Experts should occasionally be consulted 
both in regards to the content, as well as the authenticity of the actual file.  
Digital forensic experts should be consulted when there is suspicion that 
pictures, videos or audio have been digitally altered. This is most helpful with material 
that has not been uploaded to social media sites (a process which normally alters and 
compresses data), such as digital images and videos collected directly from cell 
phones of eyewitness by field researchers. Counterfeit detection in digital evidence is a 
highly technical process that requires specialized training and software, and 
unfortunately no affordable or open source tools exist to perform clone detection or 
similar methods. However, human rights researchers can take some basic steps to 
detect traces of editing in digital images. Using a program such as JPEG Snoop, or 
reviewing HEX data with a freely available HEX viewer, can reveal if a .jpg image was 
processed with editing software such as Photoshop (see image case study below). 
However, please note that processing an image with specialized photo-editing software 
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does not necessarily mean that the content of the image has been altered—simply 
resaving the photo in Photoshop in order to decrease the file size is enough to leave 
traces of the software, for example. 
Other experts, such as weapons specialists or forensic pathologists, should be 
consulted to establish certain facts from the actual content of an image or video. For 
example, both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International consulted with 
chemical and medical experts to review YouTube videos and photos showing the 
impact of the chemical weapons attack in Syria on 21 August 2013.32 It was this highly 
specialized expert input that—in combination with traditional research such as 
interviews of witnesses via Skype—allowed the establishment of specific facts without 
having physical access to the attack site.33 
Step 6: Integration with other research 
Significant effort should be made to combine the facts gathered through the 
analysis of citizen media with other research findings, derived from both traditional and 
other innovative methods, such as witness testimony or satellite images. Citizen media 
can often present direct evidence of specific violations and can at the minimum—by 
itself—be used to support initial calls for further, independent investigations into 
apparent human rights violations or war crimes, using a standard public pressure 
advocacy strategy.34 However, corroboration normally yields the strongest results, and 
is highly recommended in line with traditional fact-finding. Additionally, as the Nigerian 
case study below will show, it is in fact the proven and well-established traditional fact-
finding methods that often reveal highly relevant findings in citizen media, such as the 
identification of specific army units. This point cannot be stressed enough, as such 
findings might go beyond human rights fact-finding and have political or legal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Human Rights Watch: Attacks on Ghouta. Analysis of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria. 10 September 
2013 http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syria_cw0913_web_1.pdf ;  
Amnesty International: Syria: Possible international armed intervention after alleged chemical weapons attack. 29 
August 2013 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/syria-possible-international-armed-intervention-after-alleged-chemical-weapons-
attack-2013-08-3  [both referenced 23 November 2014] 
33 A useful resource for human rights groups to identify relevant experts is the On-Call Scientists program by the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science. https://oncallscientists.aaas.org/en  
34 See, for example, Human Rights Watch: Sri Lanka: Execution Video Shows Need for International Inquiry. 26 August 
2009. http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/08/26/sri-lanka-execution-video-shows-need-international-inquiry ; Amnesty 
International: "Shocking" Video Shows Armed Group Carrying Out Summary Killings of Men in Syria’s Idlib Province, 
Says Amnesty International. http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/shocking-video-shows-armed-group-
carrying-out-summary-killings-of-men-in-syria-s-idlib-province-says 1 November 2012 [all referenced 25 November 
2014]  
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implications. National legislation, such as the Leahy Law in the United States, prohibits 
military aid to foreign security forces that are implicated in serious violations of human 
rights. It is precisely these sorts of details on unit involvement and command 
responsibility that have serious implications on the vetting process of the Leahy Law.35 
 
Step 7: Professional Standard Considerations  
The use of citizen media in public outputs should be carefully weighed, taking 
into consideration potential risks and ethical concerns, similar to other content such as 
witness testimony. Larger human rights organizations might have internal documents 
and guidelines regarding research and public dissemination standards. A useful, 
general resource is the International Committee of the Red Cross’s Professional 
Standards for Protection Work, whose second edition includes a chapter on new 
technologies (ICRC, 2013:77-102). While this resource addresses the issue of 
informed consent for online materials, this topic certainly remains a challenge that 
requires further research and consultations.36 Many individuals depicted in pictures and 
videos online—or the actual uploader—might not be able to provide informed consent, 
as “personal data accessible on the Internet is not always there as a result of a 
conscious choice of the individuals concerned to share information in the public domain” 
(International Committee for the Red Cross 2014: 96). Human rights groups, as 
protection and advocacy actors, have to adhere to different standards than journalists.  
The issue becomes most pressing when dealing with footage that documents 
sexual violence, which came to light prominently following an incident in Cairo in June 
2014 (Bair 2014a). A crucial consideration for human rights groups should be to blur 
faces of individuals visible in pictures or videos, in order to protect the identity or to 
avoid re-victimization (Bair 2014b). In addition to using photo or video editing software, 
YouTube includes a face-blurring tool that can be used to conceal identities.37 An often 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 U.S. Department of State: An Overview of the Leahy Vetting Process. 9 July, 2013 
http://www.humanrights.gov/dyn/an-overview-of-the-leahy-vetting-process.html [referenced 21 July, 2015]  
36 A notable new effort in this regard is the Responsible Data Forum, “a collaborative effort to develop useful tools and 
strategies for dealing with the ethical, security and privacy challenges facing data-driven advocacy.” 
https://responsibledata.io/; Additionally, see a good resource on this topic specifically for video: Ethical Guidelines for 
Using Eyewitness Videos in Human Rights Reporting and Advocacy https://lab.witness.org/announcing-witness-ethical-
guidelines-for-using-eyewitness-footage-in-human-rights/ [referenced 26 December 2015] 
37 See more details on this tool at YouTube’s blog: Face blurring: when footage requires anonymity. 18 July 2012 
http://youtube-global.blogspot.ie/2012/07/face-blurring-when-footage-requires.html [referenced 21 July 2015] 
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ignored consideration is that identity protection should also be applied to suspected 
perpetrators of violations, which is especially important for human rights groups that 
promote the rule of law, including a right to a fair trial. 
Finally, special consideration should be given to the responsibility that human 
rights groups have when archiving content that has been removed from the public 
domain. Preservation of content as the first step in the analytical process also yields 
ethical and risk questions. Preserved content that was later removed by an uploader 
for various reasons, including risk or privacy considerations, raises questions about 
access to and use of this content for research and public output. Further research into 
this topic is urgently needed. 
 
Case Studies 
Case Study 1: Video38 
In 2014, Amnesty International reviewed dozens of videos and images 
stemming from the escalating conflict in northeastern Nigeria. Human rights groups 
and news organizations have extensively documented abuses by Boko Haram in the 
country. But this content proved especially interesting, as the majority of it depicts 
violations by Nigerian armed forces and the state-sponsored militia Civilian Joint Task 
Force (CJTF). 
The most relevant content related to events on 14 March 2014, when Boko 
Haram attacked the Giwa military barracks in Maiduguri, the state capital of Borno 
state. The attack was captured on camera and shared on YouTube by Boko Haram for 
propaganda purposes. It resulted in the escape of several hundred detainees. The 
response by authorities can only be described as shocking: Within hours, Nigerian 
armed forces and the CJTF extra-judicially executed more than 600 people, mostly 
recaptured detainees, often in plain sight, and often on camera. Thorough research 
over several months allowed us to connect different video and photographs to paint a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 A longer and slightly different version of this case study has been previously published: Using UGC in human rights 
and war crimes investigations. Verification Handbook For Investigative Reporting, Chapter 7. 
http://verificationhandbook.com/book2/chapter7.php; For more details and insights on this case, see also: Koettl, C: 
Using technology to expose war crimes in Nigeria. 4 June 2015 http://newafricanmagazine.com/using-technology-to-
expose-war-crimes-in-nigeria/ [referenced 10 July 2015] 
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disturbing picture of the behavior of Nigerian armed forces. For example, one grainy 
cell phone video showed a soldier dragging an unarmed man into the middle of a street 
and executing him, next to a pile of corpses. 
 
More than 100 videos and images were analyzed for reports on violations by Nigerian security forces and 
Boko Haram. 
We first performed standard content analysis. This involved extracting the 
specifications of the road and street lamps, buildings and vegetation, as well as details 
related to the people seen in the video, such as clothes and military equipment. 
Reviewing the video frame by frame greatly aided with this process. The geographic 
features were then compared to satellite images of the area on Google Earth. Based 
on this work, it was possible to pinpoint the likely location within Maiduguri, a large city 
of around a million people. 
Several months later, additional photographs, both open source and directly 
collected from local sources, were used to paint a more comprehensive and even more 
worrisome picture of the incident. For example, at least two of the victims had their 
hands tied behind their backs. It is noteworthy that several photographs in our 
possession were actually geotagged. We discovered this by using an EXIF reader to 
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examine the metadata in the photo. This location data proved a perfect match to the 
street corner we identified as part of the content analysis of the initial video, 
highlighting the importance of both content analysis and metadata review in the 
verification process.  
Other videos from the same day documented an even more gruesome scene, 
which suggested another war crime. They show the killing of several unarmed men. 
We slowed the videos to perform a content analysis in order to identify distinctive 
markings on the soldiers and victims, or anything that could indicate location, time or 
date. This revealed two important details: a soldier wearing a black flak jacket stating 
“Borno State. Operation Flush,” the name of the military operation in northeastern 
Nigeria; and, for a split second, an ID number on a rifle (“81BN/SP/407”) became 
visible. No distinctive geographic features were visible that could be used to identify the 
exact location. 
 
Examples of various details extracted from the videos, which are relevant in human rights investigations: 
Flak jackets and military vehicles; tied hands of executed victims; inventory numbers on cars and rifle 
(colors inverted using VLC Player, for enhancement purposes only). 
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Amnesty International subsequently interviewed several military sources that 
independently confirmed the incident, including the date and general location outside of 
Maiduguri. An Amnesty International researcher was also able to secure the actual 
video files while on a field mission to the area. This allowed us to conduct metadata 
analysis that is often not possible with online content, since social media sites regularly 
modify or remove metadata during the upload process. 
The data corroborated that the footage had been created on 14 March 2014. 
Obtaining the original files is often possible only through well-established local contacts 
and networks, who might share content in person or via email (ideally encrypted). 
Savvy news desk researchers and journalists who might be inclined to contact local 
sources via Twitter or other public platform should consider the risk implications for 
asking for such sensitive footage from contacts in insecure environments. 
In this case, two military sources stated that the perpetrators may be part of the 
81 Battalion, which operates in Borno state, and that the rifle ID number refers to a 
“Support Company” of that battalion. Most important, several sources, which had to 
remain anonymous, separately stated that this specific rifle had not been reported 
stolen, disqualifying the predictable response by Nigerian authorities that the soldiers 
were actually impostors using stolen equipment. 
After an initial public statement39 about the most dramatic footage (please note 
that Amnesty International blurred the faces of both victims and perpetrators in its 
public release), AI continued its investigation for several months, bringing together 
traditional research, such as testimony, with satellite imagery and the video footage 
and photographs detailed above. This citizen media supported the overall conclusion of 
the investigation that both Boko Haram and Nigerian armed forces were implicated in 
crimes against humanity. 40  These findings can have serious implications, as the 
violations detailed are crimes under international law, and are therefore subject to 
universal jurisdiction and fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Amnesty International: Nigeria: Gruesome footage implicates military in war crimes. 5 August 2014 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/08/nigeria-gruesome-footage-implicates-military-war-crimes/ [referenced 
10 July 2015] 
40 See detailed Amnesty International reports: 'Our job is to shoot, slaughter and kill': Boko Haram's reign of terror in 
north east Nigeria. 13 April 2015 https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/1360/2015/en/ ; Nigeria: Stars on their 
shoulders: Blood on their hands: War crimes committed by the Nigerian military. 2 June 2015 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/1657/2015/en/ [referenced 10 July 2015] 
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It is important to note that much of this analysis, including repeated slow motion 
review of horrific execution videos, had been conducted without having proper self-care 
plans or institutional policies in place to deal with exposure to graphic footage. In 
hindsight, this should be considered a worst practice, and any analytical process for 
reviewing graphic citizen media should be embedded within proper self-care planning 
and organizational support, in order to minimize risk of secondary trauma.  
 
Case Study 2: Image 
Note: This case study has been anonymized due to its sensitive nature. 
In late November 2014, a human rights researcher received a series of pictures 
of an imprisoned person. A source, who sent the images via WhatsApp, shared it to 
support claims of torture in detention, and stated that the images were leaked from the 
place of detention. One image showed the face and upper body of a person in a prison 
uniform, with the face being marked with several dark spots resembling bruises. The 
source later also shared that the pictures had been received five months before they 
were forwarded to the human rights researcher.  
The image of the face with potential bruises became the focus of the research. 
There was no useful metadata associated with this content, which could have helped 
with the verification of the image and associated claim. The first red flag was the image 
size—the image appeared to be cropped. This suspicion was further strengthened 
when reviewing the exact resolution, which was 465 x 764 pixels. As a rule of thumb, 
width and height of an image should result in a whole number when divided by eight.  
Resolutions of most digital cameras are multiples of eight, which can be verified by 
reviewing a camera’s technical specifications. However, there are exceptions to this 
rule, especially with mobile apps and panoramic functions.41 In the current case, this 
check resulted in 58.125 x 95.5 pixels.42 A review of the image with JPEGSnoop 
revealed traces of Photoshop, a second fact that justified exercising extreme caution 
with the image.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 I am thankful to Catalin Grigoras of the National Center for Media Forensics for this insight.  
42 A resolution of an unaltered image taken with a Canon Rebel T3i, for example, is 5184 x 3456. Divided by eight 
results in 648 x 432. 
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After this basic review, the next step was to look for the same or similar content 
online. A simple online search with the name of the prisoner and the word “tortured” 
immediately led to an almost identical image posted on a blog—in mid October 2013. 
This image was not new, but at least 13 months old. The field researcher, who 
originally received the image and who has in-depth country knowledge and language 
skills, was able to identify a Facebook page of the prison in question and a series of 
photographs of the research subject. Among them was the ”original” image that served 
as the basis for the altered version that was shared with the researchers. The image 
that was posted by prison authorities included a superimposed date (early October 
2013), and the prisoner is looking in the opposite direction. The image that was sent to 
the researchers was mirrored (in addition to being cropped), likely in order to easier 
avoid detection. Most importantly, in the image that was sent for analysis, the color had 
been heavily adjusted, resulting in the many black spots in the prisoner’s face. Using 
free tools and basic online research, we were able to establish the following facts: 
1. The image was over a year old and had been previously shared online—it was 
based on an image posted on the Facebook page of the prison, and was not 
leaked as believed by the source. 
2. The image was cropped. 
3. The image had been mirrored and digitally altered. 
4. The color of the image was heavily adjusted. 
5. The image editing software Photoshop was used to make alterations. 
 
Following these findings, this image was not included in any research outputs, 
which not only might have done considerable damage to the reputation of the human 
rights organization that analyzed the image, but might have also had a negative impact 
on a very sensitive political and legal situation.  
Outlook: Realizing the full potential of citizen media for 
human rights fact-finding 
Much progress has been made in the recent past to integrate citizen media into 
fact-finding. The central actors in the human rights fact-finding space, such as NGOs 
like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch and special procedures of the UN 
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Human Rights Council, regularly reference citizen media in their reporting and 
occasionally issue dedicated statements in response to the emergence of a new online 
video. The relevance of citizen media is likely to increase considering the spread of 
mobile phones and Internet connectivity.  
In order to fully realize the potential of citizen media for human rights fact-
finding and ultimately for securing accountability, a few central challenges should be 
recognized and addressed. First, few resources and trainings exist to make the 
analysis of citizen media a standard skill for human rights researchers. There appears 
to be a discrepancy between trainings and resources on interviewing techniques and 
non-traditional research methodologies. Secondly, most efforts for analyzing citizen 
media are focused on individual images or videos, making them exceptionally powerful 
pieces of evidence to document single violations, such as war crimes. However, a 
huge challenge remains in how to analyze large amounts of images or video in a timely 
manner in order to reveal trends and patterns. This will be important to ultimately better 
support the documentation of other categories of crimes, such as crimes against 
humanity, which are characterized by a widespread or systematic nature.43 Looking at 
the massive number of videos related to the Syrian conflict, the human rights 
community currently has no suitable tools at its disposal to review, analyze and, most 
importantly, connect all these videos in order to identify patterns and trends. 
The following recommendations are intended to address these key challenges, 
among others:  
 
To human rights organizations 
• Include the fundamentals of open source research and verification in induction 
trainings for new researchers and campaigners. Considering the increasing 
relevance of citizen media in fact-finding, combined with lower barriers to 
spread misinformation and manipulated content, basic skills in this new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Several projects from various industries are currently in its infancy to alleviate this challenge. These include efforts by 
the Syria Justice and Accountability Center; Forensic Architecture (Pattrn, http://pattrn.co/); and a major technology 
company. A notable effort in academia is being conducted by Carnegie Mellon University through its Event Labeling 
through Analytic Media Processing (E-LAMP) project. See details on this project: Aronson, J; Xu, S.; Hauptmann, A. 
2015. Video Analytics for Conflict Monitoring and Human Rights Documentation (Center for Human Fights Science 
Technical Report). http://humanrightstechnology.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/ELAMP_IEEE-MM-article.pdf 
[referenced 8 November 2015] 
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research methodology should be seen as an investment into organizational and 
individual professional development. 
• Produce both practical and academic publications on this topic, including case 
studies, best practices and analytical workflows.  
• Develop secondary trauma policies and implement self-care requirements for 
staff working regularly with citizen media. 
 
To funders 
• Provide course development grants to build curriculums and capacity in this 
field. This should be coordinated with efforts already underway in the journalism 
sector. 
• Give dedicated financial support to the development of more resources for 
coping with secondary trauma.44 
• Provide funding to academic and policy research on open source human rights 
research and verification. 
• Support the development of technical analysis tools such as free and open 
source forensic video analysis software, to enhance and automate the 
analytical process.45 Digital forensic software is very expensive to develop and 
cheap to copy, incentivizing proprietary solutions, whose use in human rights 
research creates challenges regarding transparency and replicability of the 
analysis (Wexler 2015). Further, due to high cost implications and the proximity 
of commercial providers to intelligence and law enforcement, these solutions 
appear unattractive to human rights groups. Simple and easily accessible 
software can aid with analysis, especially while point-of-capture apps (whose 
development were supported by funders in the past) are not being widely 
adopted yet. 
 
To academics and scientists 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The Open Society Foundation recently funded the first phase of a project on this topic. However, further funding is still 
needed to complete this project by the Eyewitness Media Hub. 
45 The Knight Prototype Fund recently funded a project for automated metadata and image analysis (implemented by 
journalists). See http://www.verified-pixel.com/  
Koettl, C., 'Analytical Framework for Citizen Media Research and Verification’, January 2016 
	  
31 
• Partner with human rights groups to tackle the challenge of dealing with large 
datasets and with automating some of the analytical steps that are currently 
conducted manually.46 
• Partner with human rights groups, including on joint funding proposals, to 
develop curricula. 
 
To technology companies 
• Be transparent regarding the functionality of your social platforms, such as 
timestamp or location information. 
• Work with human rights groups to ensure human rights documentation is not 
lost due to violations of terms of service. 
• Encourage technical staff to provide pro-bono work in support of human rights 
organizations working on open source verification, especially in support of 
automating parts of the analytical process.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 One notable effort is already under way at Carnegie Mellon University 
http://www.cmu.edu/chrs/conferences/vfhr/index.html [referenced 24 November 2014] 
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